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We address security of the quantum key distribution scheme based on the noisy modulation of coherent
states and investigate how it is robust against noise in the modulation regardless of the particular technical
implementation. As the trusted preparation noise is shown to be security breaking even for purely lossy channels,
we reveal the essential difference between two types of trusted noise, namely sender-side preparation noise and
receiver-side detection noise, the latter being security preserving. We consider the method of sender-side state
purification to compensate the preparation noise and show its applicability in the realistic conditions of channel
loss, untrusted channel excess noise, and trusted detection noise. We show that purification makes the scheme
robust to the preparation noise (i.e., even the arbitrary noisy coherent states can in principle be used for the
purpose of quantum key distribution). We also take into account the effect of realistic reconciliation and show
that the purification method is still efficient in this case up to a limited value of preparation noise.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure key distribution [1] with continuous variables [2]
is a recent practical example of the usefulness of quantum
properties exhibited by coherent states generated with ordi-
nary laser systems. The pure coherent states were surpris-
ingly found to be the sufficient resource to distribute a secret
key, even through a strongly attenuating channel [3–6], while
the inefficiency and electronic noise of a homodyne detector
in a trusted receiver station does not break security of the key
distribution [7]. Recently, security analysis of excess noise in
the channel and detector was discussed in [8]; moreover, the
noise at the remote side was shown to be useful for the scheme
security [9]. However, it was also recently shown that excess
noise in trusted state preparation can break the security even
for a purely lossy channel and ideal homodyne detector [10].
To eliminate this security break, an optimized purification of
the prepared noisy coherent states in the trusted sender station
was proposed. Interestingly, it was shown that secure com-
munication through any purely lossy channel is possible for
arbitrary noisy coherent states, assuming ideal homodyne de-
tection [10]. From this follows that even a noisy coherent state
can be a useful quantum resource for secure key distribution
in the perfect experimental conditions of pure channel loss.
Still an open question is how generally valid is this result for
an imperfect homodyne detector, with remaining excess noise
in the channel and realistic key reconciliation.
In this article, we discuss security of the continuous-
variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) with noisy co-
herent states through a lossy and noisy channel. The prepa-
ration noise is due to the imperfect modulation, which was
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shown to be destructive for the security of the scheme. We
reveal the fundamental difference between various types of
trusted noise and show the possibility to establish the secure
key transmission with noisy coherent states upon a high level
of preparation noise using the local state manipulations in the
presence of either trusted detection noise or untrusted channel
noise. We also investigate the limits of high modulation vari-
ance and show that in this case we can practically eliminate
the negative effect of the preparation noise using optimal pu-
rification. In addition, we show that the positive purification
effect is present also upon limited reconciliation efficiency.
The article is structured as follows: in Sec. II we briefly
recall the QKD with noisy coherent states and mention the
effect of the purely lossy channel; in Sec. III we add detection
noise on the trusted remote party side; in Sec. IV we consider
untrusted channel noise; in Sec. V we take into account the
effect of the realistic error correction with limited efficiency;
and then we finish the article with some concluding remarks.
II. COHERENT STATES PROTOCOL
CV QKD with coherent states is based on the Gaussian
modulation of the states produced by a laser in such a way
that their mixture constitutes a thermal state centered in an
origin of phase space and characterized by a source variance
V = 1 + σ, where σ is the modulation variance. Such a
setup is referred to as the prepare and measure (P&M ) as
one of the trusted parties (Alice) for each next key bit applies
modulation to the coherent states, generating them centered at
some two Gaussian-distributed values of quadratures (Fig. 1).
The prepared state travels though a quantum channel to the re-
mote trusted party (Bob), which performs the homodyne mea-
surement of a randomly selected quadrature and stores the re-
sult. Lately, as the sufficient number of preparation and mea-
surement events is carried out, the parties perform key sift-
2ing when Bob, using a classical channel, reveals which of two
quadratures he was measuring for each bit and Alice keeps the
corresponding bit value, such a scheme being named reverse
reconciliation [3]. From the obtained classically correlated
data, if they they are correlated enough (which is checked by
comparison of the randomly selected subsets), trusted parties
can distill the secure cryptographic key. Physically, the ex-
cess noise arises mainly in the imperfect optical modulator so
that each coherent state has the variance 1 + ∆V , where ∆V
is the preparation noise. Besides preparation noise, another
main source of imperfection is the quantum channel, which
has nonunit transmittivity η, thus suppressing the signal with
losses and adding excess noise η to the signal modulation.
Also imperfect detection at Bob’s side is assumed, as his ho-
modyne detector has some nonunit efficiency and the excess
electronic noise; we consider imperfect detection as adding
excess detection noise χ. Here, for the trusted detector we
treat loss and noise in the detection jointly, as the output of
the detector is typically classically amplified; thus the detec-
tor can be purely noisy so that χ is the total additive noise of
the detector. At that, the state preparation is assumed to be
completely secure (i.e., no attack of an eavesdropper in the
sender station is allowed and no side signal leaves the sta-
tion). Also, the receiver station is trusted, which means that
no information is leaking to a potential eavesdropper, whereas
the quantum channel is untrusted as it is out of control of the
trusted parties.
It already is well known that untrusted channel noise is lim-
iting the security of CV QKD, whereas trusted detection noise
is not contributing to the the knowledge of Eve and is just
quantitatively reducing the key rate [3]. At the same time, it
was recently shown that the preparation noise, although be-
ing also trusted, is breaking the security of the CV QKD [10].
Thus, in this article we stress out the essential difference be-
tween two types of trusted noise, namely preparation and de-
tection, in their effect on the CV QKD security and study the
method to compensate the negative effect of trusted prepa-
ration noise by applying state purification. In our theoret-
ical analysis, we model the CV QKD coherent states-based
scheme in order to estimate its security, taking realistic values
of the parameters of the scheme. In particular, we suppose that
the quantum channel has low transmittance η ∈ (0.01, 0.1),
which corresponds to long-distance optical fibers; the source
variance V is mostly taken within the range V ∈ (10, 100),
which well corresponds to recent experiments in CV QKD,
where the source variance reached approximately 20 [8] or
40 [3] shot-noise units. The typical values of the homodyne
detector electonic noise in the mentioned experiments were
0.041 and 0.33, respectively, but the limited detection effi-
ciency makes the overall homodyne detection noise higher.
At the same time, it is hard to assess the possible values
of the preparation noise, as the sources of this noise may be
essentially different; it can be either imperfect modulation of
a shot-noise limited coherent source or the increased variance
of a laser, which is used to produce the exact state, displaced
according to a next bit value. Besides, the values of such
noise were not discussed in experimental CV QKD as this
noise is difficult to estimate and calibrate [8]. Hence all the
noise in the receiving station was considered to be the impact
of Eve and the sources were usually assumed as ideal, focus-
ing on other possible imperfections. However, the simplest
sources for a classical coherent optical communication link
are cheap laser diodes together with the usual low-frequency
integrated amplitude and phase modulators [12]. While such a
source still has enough temporal coherence to build the coher-
ent communication link, its intensity and phase noise added
at the lower modulation frequencies makes the source to be
not shot-noise limited, exhibiting additional excess noise [13].
For the classical coherent communication, this is not a serious
problem, and these issues can be considered to be just techni-
cal, but it appears to be essential for QKD, as the preparation
noise can quickly lead to a security break. Hence, we propose
to distinguish between trusted preparation noise and the rest of
the noise and show that this may improve the applicability of
CV QKD as we can compensate security-breaking preparation
noise. Note, that in the case of the discrete-variable coding the
mixed signal states were considered already in [11].
It is worth mentioning, that the method of sender-side atten-
uation, which we propose and investigate in this article in or-
der to purify the states and make CV QKD more robust to the
preparation noise, is most likely just one of the possible ways
to reduce the negative effect of the state preparation noise. Yet
we propose it as the simplest method to purify the states by us-
ing just a linear optical device, the beam-splitter, in case the
noisy source is given and cannot be otherwise improved. In
addition, by introducing attenuation T , we can clearly show
the effect analytically and optimize it as well as estimate the
limitations, imposed on the purification method by the recon-
ciliation efficiency.
As a matter of fact, the attenuation of the signal on the
trusted source side was already applied in [8] without the
analysis of the impact. Its effect is actually twofold: to pu-
rify the noisy states by suppressing the noise and to opti-
mize the signal-to-noise ratio for the given reconciliation ef-
ficiency. Still, the purifying effect was not theoretically ana-
lyzed. Moreover, the attenuation of laser diodes was proposed
by decreasing their power [7], but this method is not appli-
cable for the case, when modulation is performed directly in
the laser, not by a standalone modulator. Also, the feedback
systems were applied [3, 8] to control the level of modulation
and they can be used to reduce the noise, but as their effect is
nonlinear, it is not considered in this article.
For the security analysis, it is assumed that Eve couples
signal pulses to her ancillary states and stores them in a quan-
tum memory. Then she can perform either an individual at-
tack after the key sifting procedure, when she measures her
ancillary states individually, or a collective attack during the
key distillation, when she applies the optimal collective mea-
surement on the stored ancillary states. We limit our study of
security of the scheme by Gaussian collective attacks as they
were shown to be optimal [6] and keep to the the recent proof,
that, similar to the case of discrete-variable QKD, the pro-
tocol is secure against the most general attacks, if it is secure
against the collective ones [14]. For individual attacks, in case
of reverse reconciliation, the security analysis is based on the
fact that maximum information available to Eve is bounded
3FIG. 1: Continuous-variables quantum key distribution scheme
based on the noisy coherent states: Laser beam is modulated to en-
code information in modulator M producing coherent states with su-
perposed additive phase-insensitive noise ∆V . It passes through a
variable attenuator with transmittance T (with a second port in vac-
uum mode C) followed by the channel described by excess noise ǫ
and channel transmittivity η toward Bob’s homodyne detector with
additive noise χ. Inlay: equivalent model of Alice noisy state prepa-
ration based on the entangled signal source (modes A,B) of variance
V and entangled noise source (modes F,G) of variance∆V , coupled
to signal mode, Alice performing heterodyne measurement on mode
B; rest of the scheme is the same as for coherent state modulation.
by the classical (Shannon) mutual information, characterizing
her knowledge of Bob’s data, while in the case of collective
attacks Eve is possessing the quantum (von Neumann) infor-
mation on Bob’s measurement results, which is limited by the
Holevo bound; in all cases, the criterion for security is formu-
lated as the exceeding of mutual information between Alice
and Bob over the information available to Eve on Bob’s data;
under this condition the secure key can be distilled by the stan-
dard procedures. Thus, for the collective attack scenario and
one-way classical postprocessing, there is always a key distil-
lation protocol generating secure key with minimal rate
I = IAB − χBE , (1)
where IAB is Shannon mutual information from data ob-
tained by Alice and Bob, χBE is the Holevo information
quantity between receiver B and potential eavesdropper Eve
[15]. The Holevo quantity can be written as χBE = SE −∫
P (B)SE|BdB, where SE is von Neumann entropy of the
eavesdropper’s state ρE [6]. The quantity SE|B is the von
Neumann entropy of the eavesdropper state ρE|B conditioned
by the receiver measurement result B, and P (B) is the dis-
tribution of the measured results. If I > 0, then information
shared by Alice and Bob is larger than information accessi-
ble to an eavesdropper which is performing collective attacks.
Then optimal distillation procedure can generate a secure key
between trusted parties.
A weaker condition is for security against only the indi-
vidual attacks. In this case, the lower bound on secure key
rate is given Ii = IAB − IBE , where IBE is Shannon mu-
tual information between the eavesdropper and the receiver,
if the eavesdropper applies an optimal strategy. Remarkably,
for ideal coherent-state preparation without any excess noise,
it is always possible to achieve Imax = − log2(1 − η)/2 > 0
for an arbitrary lossy channel (but without excess noise) with
η > 0 and for arbitrary modulation variance σ > 0 [5].
While we consider the security of the scheme for collective
attacks, we will use the individual attack case to estimate the
regions of parameters, where the scheme already becomes in-
secure for any attacks, because insecurity against individual
attacks automatically means insecurity against the collective,
as the latter are more effective. Furthermore, the individual
attack case enables us to analytically show the effect of state
purification as well as constitute the limits to which collective
attacks tend in the high modulation regime.
So, we investigate the security of the scheme based on the
noisy coherent states in different realistic conditions. The sit-
uation, when only the state preparation noise is present in
the CV QKD based on the coherent states and the quantum
channel is purely lossy, was already addressed in [10]. It was
shown that the preparation noise is strongly destructive for se-
curity of the scheme, but the purification on the side of the
trusted source can provide the possibility to establish secure
key distribution upon any value of the preparation noise, and
that security is guaranteed against both individual and collec-
tive attacks. Although seeming contradictory at first glance,
this result can be clearly explained from the physical consid-
erations. As the state coherence is preserved upon any atten-
uation, by suppressing the noisy coherent state we suppress
the noise, but the state coherence remains, so that while the
intensity becomes lower and the key rate decreases, the state
becomes pure enough to provide the security of the key distri-
bution, which without purification could not be possible. The
earlier work provided the proof of principle for suppressing
preparation noise with purification, while in this article we
perform the feasibility check of the method in the realistic
conditions of trusted detection noise, untrusted channel noise,
and imperfect key reconciliation.
Generally we investigate whether a noisy source can be
used for a CV coherent states-based QKD given that the
source cannot be replaced with a better one. While the exact
level of preparation noise is the question of cost and complex-
ity of the state preparation equipment, in this article we rather
generally discuss the impact of the preparation noise on the
QKD security, than refer to a specific experimental arrange-
ment. In this sense, our work is a step from perfect laboratory
conditions toward the realistic CV QKD, based on the afford-
able signal sources.
III. NOISELESS CHANNEL AND TRUSTED DETECTION
NOISE
First we generalize the result presented in [10] that is valid
for the lossy channel and ideal homodyne detector. Keep-
ing the noiseless channel in mind, we assume a realistic lossy
and noisy trusted homodyne detector. This represents an op-
timistic scenario of realistic experimental setup, taking into
account the minimal impact of natural channel background
noise into narrow-band homodyne detection.
First we calculate the impact of noise on the security against
individual attacks to estimate the insecurity region. As we per-
4form the calculations in the equivalent entangled-based source
setup [8], the overall expression for the lower bound on the
key rate, which is secure against individual attacks using the
reverse reconciliation, is [3]
Ii =
1
2
log2
VB|E
VB|AM
, (2)
where VB|E = VB − C
2
BE
VE
and VB|AM = VB − C
2
AB
VA+1
are the
relevant conditional variances. The one unit of noise added to
VA appears from the heterodyne measurement on Alice’s side.
In our case, the variances are VA = V , VB = η(V +∆V ) +
1 − η + χ and VE = (1 − η)(V + ∆V ) + η and the mode
correlations are CBE =
√
η(1 − η)(1 − V − ∆V ) whereas
CAB =
√
η(V 2 − 1). Detection noise χ, being out of control
by the eavesdropper, is not involved in the correlation CBE ;
hence, it does not break the security but only lowers the key
rate. The conditional variances are VB|AM = 1 + η∆V + χ
and
VB|E =
1
η
V+∆V + 1− η
+ χ; (3)
then from the explicit expression (2) for the lower bound on
key rate in this case we can derive the security constraint on
the level of the preparation noise:
∆V <
1
2
− V
2
+
√
(V − 1)
(
V − 1 + 4
1− η
)
, (4)
which does not depend on the detection noise, added on the
remote receiving side.
In the limit of arbitrary large source variance (i.e., arbitrary
high modulation), this constraint turns to
∆V <
1
1− η , (5)
which means that for strongly attenuating channels η <<
1, even if the modulation is arbitrarily high, the preparation
noise should not exceed one shot noise unit, while this con-
dition becomes more restrictive for the realistic cases of finite
modulation.
In the case of collective attacks, as mentioned, Eve’s infor-
mation on the key is limited by the Holevo quantity. Since
we are considering a purely attenuating channel, we substi-
tute it by a beam splitter with the transmittance equivalent
to the channel transmittivity η. We perform the straight-
forward calculations of the Holevo quantity χBE = SE −∫
P (B)SE|BdB, bounding Eve’s quantum information from
a state going from the beam splitter to Eve. Since we are
working with Gaussian states, entropy SE|B does not de-
pend on the Bob’s measurement result and we can simply use
χBE = SE − SE|B . Using the expression for von Neumann
entropies [16], the Holevo quantity is calculated from
χBE = G(
λ1 − 1
2
)−G(λ2 − 1
2
), (6)
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FIG. 2: The effect of trusted detection noise χ and trusted preparation
noise ∆V on the secret key in the case of no purification. Security
against collective attacks is considered, source variance V = 20, and
channel transmittivity η = 0.01.
whereG(x) = (x+1) log(x+1)−x log x, λ1 is the symplec-
tic eigenvalue of Eve’s mode covariance matrix γE = VEI, in
fact λ1 =
√
DetγE and λ2 is the symplectic eigenvalue of the
covariance matrix γxBE characterizing the state of Eve’s mode
after Bob’s projective measurement:
γxBE = γE − σBE(XγBX)MPσTBE , (7)
where γB = VBI is the covariance matrix of Bob’s mode,
σBE characterizes correlation between Bob’s and Eve’s
modes, MP stands for Moore Penrose inverse of a matrix (also
known as pseudoinverse) and
X =
(
1 0
0 0
)
. (8)
Finally, the mutual information IAB is calculated using Shan-
non entropies as
IAB =
1
2
log2
VA + 1
VA|B + 1
. (9)
The explicit expression for the key rate is obtainable ana-
lytically, but it is too lengthly. However, similarly to the case
of individual attacks, the security of the scheme is limited by
the preparation noise and the boundary for collective attacks is
close to that of the individual attacks (4), while in the limit of
arbitrary high modulation it exactly coincides with (5). The
effect of the preparation noise in comparison to the effect
of the trusted detection noise in case of collective attacks is
shown in Fig. 2 for the lossy channel with η = 0.01 and re-
alistic source variance V = 20. One may see, that despite
the fact, that both kinds of noise are trusted, the preparation
noise is security breaking, unlike the detection noise, which
is only quantitatively reducing the key rate – the effect, which
we observed above for the individual attacks case.
Now let us assume that purifying attenuation is applied to
the signal states prior to sending them through the quantum
5channel. By supposing the attenuator transmittivity is T , we
can see its positive affect already for individual attacks, as the
lower bound on the key rate in this case is
Ii =
1
2
log2
(
1 + T (V +∆V − 1)
1 + T (V +∆V − 1)(1− η) + χ
)
−
− 1
2
log2 (1 + Tη∆V + χ) (10)
and from this expression it is clear that attenuation T is sup-
pressing the preparation noise ∆V . If the modulation variance
is arbitrary high, this effect is even more evident, as the key
rate turns to
Ii
∣∣
V→∞
=
1
2
log2
(
1
1− η + χ
)
−
− 1
2
log2 (1 + Tη∆V + χ), (11)
while the preparation noise ∆V threshold becomes
∆Vi,max
∣∣
V→∞
=
1
T (1− η) (12)
and can be made arbitrary high by purification.
For the finite V , if we take the derivative of the key rate (10)
by purifying attenuation T in the point T = 0, we obtain
dIi
dT

T=0
=
1
log 4
η(V − 1)
1 + χ
, (13)
which is always positive as V ≥ 1. This means that close
to T = 0 there is always some T > 0 that is sufficient to
provide with the secure key rate because at point T = 0, the
key rate is equal to 0. From the given expressions it is evident
that detection noise, being not under the control of an eaves-
dropper, only decreases the key rate but does not destroy the
transmission, even for finite source variance V , the detection
noise χ does not change the security bounds, whereas prepara-
tion noise ∆V plays crucial role. It is also worth mentioning
that while secure key transmission is possible for arbitrarily
high preparation noise upon arbitrary strong purification, for
the given parameters, there always exists an optimal purifica-
tion level, which maximizes the secure key rate. We skip the
corresponding lengthly equations here, but in the further ex-
position we calculate the maximal key rate values in various
conditions.
If the optimal purification is applied on the noisy signal and
the modulation is extremely intense so that the source variance
V →∞, then the expression for the bound on the key rate for
individual attacks (10) analytically turns to the expression for
the case when the preparation is pure, i.e. ∆V = 0 and the
modulation is infinitely high:
Ii
∣∣T=Topt
V→∞
=
1
2
log
1 + χ(1− η)
(1 + χ)(1 − η) = Ii
∣∣∆V=0
V→∞
, (14)
which means that by combining optimal purification with
large modulation variance we can completely compensate the
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FIG. 3: The effect of trusted detection noise χ and trusted prepa-
ration noise ∆V on the secret key if the optimal purification is ap-
plied. Security against collective attacks is considered, source vari-
ance V = 20, and channel transmittivity η = 0.01.
negative effect of preparation noise and achieve the values of
key rate corresponding to the generation of pure states. Fur-
thermore we will obtain a similar result in other cases.
In the case of collective attacks, similarly to the individual
attacks, we can calculate the derivative of the key rate by pu-
rifying attenuation T and evaluate it in the limit of T → 0,
arriving at the same result as (13) for individual attacks, prov-
ing that for finite modulation variance σ, we can always find
some T close to 0, which will provide secure transmission for
any preparation noise ∆V as Ic|T→0 = 0. This result was
also confirmed numerically by estimation of the maximal key
rate secure against collective attacks upon optimal attenuator
setting for given preparation noise and channel loss level. The
optimized key rate versus preparation and detection noise is
presented in Fig. 3. It is evident from the plot that by ap-
plying optimal purification to the noisy states we can turn the
negative security-breaking effect of the preparation noise to
the same as that of the detection noise, which is only reducing
the key rate, but not turning it to zero.
In the limiting case of infinitely high modulation (i.e.,
source variance V → ∞), the expressions for key rates and
preparation noise thresholds are the same as for individual at-
tacks, namely (11,12), which means that by combining opti-
mal attenuation and arbitrary high modulation, we can com-
pletely remove the negative effect of the preparation noise.
IV. CHANNEL NOISE AND UNTRUSTED DETECTION
NOISE
While state purification was shown to be effective in case
when trusted noise is present in the system, let us estimate the
applicability of the method in the worst-case scenario, con-
sidering that noise, observable in the receiving station, is not
trusted. This can be channel background noise in the case of
broad-band detectors, untrusted detection noise or the influ-
6ence of Eve, but as channel is the only untrusted part of our
scheme, we refer to this noise as to the channel one.
Let us consider excess noise ǫ, which is out of control of
trusted parties. In the case of individual attacks, we use the
”entangling cloner” scheme [3], which allows Eve to perform
optimal eavesdropping by substituting the channel of loss η
and excess noise ǫ with her apparatus. The optimality of the
cloner attack is due to the fact that it enables Eve to reach
the limit of her knowledge on Bob’s data, described by the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, with the statement being
valid under the assumptions that the used states are Gaus-
sian and Eve knows the parameters of the channel, which well
holds in our case. The attack uses pure two-mode squeezed
vacuum state having local variance N ; one mode is reflected
to Bob’s mode through the beam splitter with reflectivity 1−η,
whereas the transmitted part is kept by Eve. The second mode
from the two-mode squeezed vacuum state is purely in the
hands of Eve. Eve is fixingN in order to satisfyN = 1+ ηǫ1−η ,
this way emulating the channel by her apparatus. She can
store both of her modes in quantum memories and measure
the appropriate quadratures of both modes in order to decrease
the noise added to the measured part of the signal mode upon
eavesdropping.
If Eve’s modes variances before interaction with the signal
are VE0
1
= VE0
2
= N and Bob’s mode is VB0 = T (V +∆V )+
1 − T , then after interaction between modes B and E1 their
variances are VB = ηVB0 + 1 − η + ηǫ and VE1 = ηVE0
1
+
(1 − η)VB0 , while correlation between the modes is CBE1 =√
η(1− η)(VE0
1
− VB0). By calculating conditional variance
as VB|E1 = VB − C2BE1/VE1 and taking into account that
after Eve’s measurement on modeE2 the conditional variance
of measurement on mode E1 becomes VE1|E2 = 1/N , we
obtain the expression for conditional variance of Eve’s results
on Bob’s measurement results, which is
VB|E = VB|E1E2 =
1
η
(
1
T (V+∆V )+1−T − 1 + ǫ
)
+ 1
(15)
whereas Alice’s uncertainty from the measured results is
VB|AM = 1 + ηT∆V + ηǫ. (16)
From the expression (10) we can explicitly obtain the lower
bound on the key rate in case of the untrusted channel noise:
Ii =
1
2
log2
(
1
η
(
1
T (V+∆V )+1−T − 1 + ǫ
)
+ 1
)
−
− 1
2
log2 (1 + Tη∆V + ǫη), (17)
The derivative of the key rate by T in the point T = 0 is
again always positive with 1log
10
4
η(V−1)
1+ηǫ , but as the key rate
at T = 0 is equal to 0 only when ǫ = 0, being negative at
any other ǫ > 0, the security upon channel noise is no longer
guaranteed only by purification.
However, we may estimate the region of channel loss in
which the purification can provide security for the given noise
levels. As the channel excess noise can be hardly detected by
trusted parties, in the entanglement cloner scenario, we take
Eve’s Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) source variance N as
the parameter, which is independent on η. Within this ap-
proach we may estimate the bound on η which restricts the
security of key distribution for the given noise levels using
the condition for optimal purification Topt < 1, this bound on
security can be expressed as
η <
1
1 + V−1N(1−V−∆V+∆V (V+∆V )2)
, (18)
it can be compared to the similar bound on η, restricting the
security of the key upon no purification, T = 1. We skip the
lengthy expression for the latter bound, but the calculations
show that the region (18) is no larger than the similar region
for no trusted side attenuation, i.e. purification provides secu-
rity of the key for any ∆V in the same region of parameters,
where the security was provided for no purification and no
preparation noise.
The optimal purification, which maximizes the secure key
rate upon given parameters can be expressed as
Topt =
1
V +∆V − 1 ×
×
(√
(V +∆V − 1)(ηǫ + 1)− η∆V
∆V (ηǫ + 1− η) − 1
)
(19)
In the limit of infinitely high modulation (i.e., source vari-
ance V →∞), the bound on the key rate turns to
Ii
∣∣
V→∞
=
1
2
log2
1
ηǫ + 1− η −
− 1
2
log2 (1 + Tη∆V + ηǫ), (20)
while the threshold on the preparation noise involves chan-
nel noise, which is additionally limiting the tolerable prepara-
tion noise:
∆Vi,max =
1− ǫ
T (1− η + ηǫ) −
ǫ
T
. (21)
However, if the optimal purification (19) is applied in this
case, the expression for the secure key rate turns to the one for
the case of infinite modulation and no preparation noise:
Ii
∣∣T=Topt
V→∞
=
1
2
log2
1
ηǫ+ 1− η −
− 1
2
log2 (1 + ηǫ) = Ii
∣∣∆V=0
V→∞
, (22)
which means that the combination of optimal purification
and sufficiently large modulation variance can completely
7eliminate the negative effect of the preparation noise. Still,
for the limited source variance, the security can be provided
for any given preparation noise within the limited range of
noise introduced by an eavesdropper as described by (18).
In the case of collective attacks performed by an eavesdrop-
per we can no longer use direct calculations of the Holevo
quantity used in the previous section. Rather, we assume that
Eve can purify the complete state shared among all the parties.
In order to perform calculations for this case we must switch
to the entangled-based scheme, which was shown to be equiv-
alent to the prepare-and-measure one [8] and take into account
all the trusted modes in Alice’s station. Similarly, we will as-
sume the worst-case detection scenario, that all the noise and
loss in the Bob’s station is untrusted.
In the entanglement-based scheme, the entanglement is
generated in the source EPR : V by mixing two pure or-
thogonally squeezed states with the squeezing variance VS
at a balanced beam splitter producing two entangled modes
A and B. The mode A in the thermal state of variance V =
(VS + V
−1
S )/2 is measured by Alice simultaneously in both
quadratures by the heterodyne detector, while mode B is cou-
pled to the noise mode G from the similar entangled source
EPR : ∆V0 of variance ∆V0, emulating preparation noise
in modulator (see Fig. 1, inlay). To emulate the additive
noise with noise variance ∆V , the coupling between B and
G is strongly asymmetrical, with almost unit transmittivity
TN ≈ 1. This setup corresponds to the preparation noise of
variance ∆V = (1− TN)∆V0.
Now the state of ABCFG is pure in the absence of chan-
nel noise and we can use the fact that Eve purifies this state so
that von Neumann entropy SE = SABCFG. Then, after Bob’s
measurement the system ACFG is pure and the conditional
entropy SE|B = SACFG|B. Thus, the Holevo quantity be-
comes χBE = SABCFG−SACFG|B. We perform calculation
of these values similarly to the case of individual attacks, by
obtaining symplectic eigenvalues of the five-mode covariance
matrixABCFG and four-mode matrixACFG|B, which can
be done purely numerically. As a result, we get the method
allowing us to perform calculations of the lower bound of the
key rate upon any conditions in the presence of both prepa-
ration and channel excess noise and we investigate the effect
of purification on the applicability of the scheme. Moreover,
we have numerically confirmed that in the absence of channel
noise this method, based on the state purification, is equiva-
lent to the method based on Eve’s mode calculation, which
was used in the previous section.
Like in the individual attacks scenario, in the case of the
collective attacks, security is now limited by both preparation
and channel excess noise. We calculated the maximal tolera-
ble channel excess noise as the function of preparation noise
both for optimal purification and no purification on Alice’s
side; the results are given in Fig. 4 for typical source variance
of V = 10 and for almost ideal case of extremely large source
variance V = 105. It was checked numerically and can be
seen from the graphs that, similarly to the case of individual
attacks, when the purification is optimized, the transmission
is now possible upon arbitrarly high preparation noise if the
channel itself was not destructive, and the scheme is not be-
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FIG. 4: Maximal tolerable channel excess noise versus given prepa-
ration noise for no Alice-side purification (dashed line) and with op-
timal attenuator setting (solid line), source variance V = 10 (lower
lines) and V = 105 (upper lines), and channel loss η = 0.01
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FIG. 5: Maximal key rate as the function of channel excess noise ǫ
and preparation noise ∆V , source variance V = 10, and channel
loss η = 0.01
coming more sensitive to the channel noise than without pu-
rification. Also for large source variance V the dependence
of maximal tolerable excess noise on given state preparation
noise approaches saturation, starting to be very slow.
Thus, we need to increase source variance V (by increasing
modulation variance σ) in order to weaken the dependence of
key rate on the preparation noise ∆V . However, for small
source variance V → 1, the dependence on preparation noise
is qualitatively the same, just the scheme quickly becomes
sensitive to channel noise.
For the realistic cases, in order to perform the qualitative
comparison, the maximal key rate was calculated as the func-
tion of preparation noise and channel excess noise and is given
in Fig. 5 for V = 10 and in Fig. 6 for V = 100. It is evi-
dent from the graph, that for relatively small channel noise the
security of the scheme can be provided upon any preparation
noise level, while as the channel noise increases, the security
is not guaranteed anymore.
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FIG. 6: Maximal key rate as the function of channel excess noise ǫ
and preparation noise ∆V , source variance V = 100, and channel
loss η = 0.01
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FIG. 7: The region of parameters for which the security is guaranteed
for source variance V = 100
The region of parameters for which the security is guaran-
teed is plotted for source variance V = 100 at Fig. 7 and
one can see that over the broad values of channel loss η and
channel noise ǫ, the security is guaranteed for any preparation
noise ∆V , while dependence on ∆V upon its high values be-
comes more linear and flat, approaching the horizontal surface
for extremely high source varance V →∞.
Let us now consider the relatively simple case of no prepa-
ration noise (i.e., ∆V = 0). The explicit expressions for the
key rate even in this case are lengthy [although analytically
obtainable through the symplectic eigenvalues of matricesAB
and A|xB and extended expression (6)]. We are interested in
extremely lossy channels, so we perform a series expansion of
the key rate with respect to source variance V around infinity
and to channel loss η around zero. Such expansion up to the
first order has the form
Ic
∣∣∆V=0 ≈ η
log 4
(
1− ǫ+ ǫ log ηǫ
2
)
+O[η]3/2 +
+
1
V
(
− 2η
log 8
+O[η]3/2
)
+O
[ 1
V
]3/2
, (23)
while for V → ∞ the approximate normalized expression
for the key rate turns to
Ic
∣∣∆V=0
V→∞
≈ 0.721η − 1.221ηǫ+ 0.721ηǫ log ηǫ. (24)
Now we perform the analytical least-squares fit of the nu-
merical data [17], obtained for the optimal purification when
preparation noise is present:
Ic
∣∣T=Topt
V→∞
≈ 0.722η − 1.237ηǫ+ 0.731ηǫ log ηǫ. (25)
which very well fits the numerical data and at the same
time is close to the approximate expression for the key rate
in the case of no preparation noise (24). We also performed
a comparison between a numerically calculated maximized
key rate upon optimal purification, high source variance V =
105, preparation noise ∆V ∈ (0, 5) and the analytically
obtained values of the key rate upon the same source vari-
ance, no purification and no preparation noise ∆V = 0 in
the region of loss η ∈ (0.01, 0.1) and channel noise ǫ ∈
(0.01, 0.1). The standard (root-mean-square) deviation of the
maximized key from the analytical key rate in case of pure co-
herent states is approximately 6 × 10−5, which is calculated
as s =
√
1
n−1
∑
n
(
Ic
∣∣∆V=0
V=105
(η, ǫ)− Ic
∣∣T=Topt
V=105
(η,∆V, ǫ)
)2
,
where n = 103 is the number of points (η,∆V, ǫ) taken within
the regions of parameters [18]. The average relative deviation,
being the ratio of the standard deviation to the average value of
the key rate for pure states I¯c
∣∣∆V=0
V=105
(η, ǫ) ≈ 0.026, is around
2%. This divergence can be made even smaller upon further
increase of source variance; for example, at V = 106 it al-
ready becomes less than 1%.
This way we claim that by combination of optimal purifi-
cation and extremely large modulation variance the key rate
for collective attacks can reach the values as for the case of no
preparation noise. Thus, with the optimal purification upon
high modulation variance we can completely eliminate prepa-
ration noise for both types of attacks, which in the absence of
purification would otherwise be destructive for the key trans-
mission.
V. REALISTIC RECONCILIATION
In previous sections we calculated the lower bound on the
secure key rate assuming that the classical postprocessing al-
gorithms, which are aimed at deriving the secure key from
the raw key, obtained by Alice and Bob, are absolutely effi-
cient and do not reduce the key length. In practice, though the
realistic error correction, which is also referred to as key rec-
onciliation [19], has limited efficiency and is being done by
9the cost of the key length, thus decreasing the overall secure
key rate. The negative effect of the realistic key reconciliation
was shown to essentially limit the applicability of the secure
key distribution with binary modulation of coherent states, es-
pecially in case of the reverse reconciliation [20]. The similar
effect is observed in the case of continuous-variables coding;
thus, we must investigate whether the state purification is still
efficient against the preparation noise if the error correction
has limited efficiency.
In practical CV QKD the influence of the realistic key rec-
onciliation is quantitatively characterized by the efficiency β,
which is reducing the mutual information, available to Alice
and Bob and stands for the fraction of the data, discarded in
the process of error correction. Thus, in the case of collective
attacks the efficient lower bound on the secure key is given by
[8]:
Ieff = βIAB − χBE (26)
Reconciliation effectiveness β is a function of the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR), but it also depends on the algorithm, being
used for the reconciliation and on the computational power,
which is available for the trusted parties. Generally, the lower
the SNR, the stronger the negative impact of the inefficient
error correction, although for a given β, there is always some
optimal value of SNR (i.e., of the modulation, applied to the
coherent signal [8] if other parameters are fixed). So, as recon-
ciliation efficiency β depends on the particular technical pa-
rameters, we do not use the explicit function describing the
dependence of β on SNR in our theoretical analysis. Instead
we assume that the dependence of β on SNR is unknown, so
we must keep both as the independent parameters and esti-
mate how tolerable is the CV QKD to the preparation noise
upon realistic reconciliation when we perform state purifica-
tion by attenuating the signal or when the purification is not
applied. As a result, we describe the area of values of SNR
and β, where the method gives positive effect. Then in any
particular case, when the dependence of β on SNR is known,
it can be easily found, whether given reconciliation efficiency
allows improvement by the proposed purification method.
Let us consider the purely lossy channel, as the effects of
both preparation noise and inefficient reconciliation are sig-
nificant already in this case. In the previous sections the lower
bound on the key rate I was the function I(V,∆V, η, T ) of
source variance, preparation noise, channel loss and trusted-
side attenuation T . At the same time, SNR Σ, being the ratio
of the signal variance to the overall excess noise variance at
the channel output is also the function Σ(V,∆V, η, T ) of the
same parameters:
Σ =
Tη(V − 1)
1 + Tη∆V
(27)
So, in order to describe the security region in terms of the
preparation noise, taking into account the inefficient reconcil-
iation, when the purification is absent i.e. T = 1, we perform
the transition V → V (Σ,∆V, η), recalculate the lower bound
FIG. 8: Threshold on the preparation noise versus reconciliation ef-
ficiency β and SNR for any source variance V and typical channel
loss η = 0.1 when no trusted-side purification is applied (T = 1)
on the key rate in new terms as Ieff (Σ,∆V, η, β), taking into
account (26) and can estimate the threshold values of prepara-
tion noise ∆Vmax, which turn this lower bound to zero. The
threshold is presented graphically as the three-dimensional
(3D) plot versus reconciliation efficiency β and SNR for typ-
ical channel loss η = 0.1 in Fig. 8, note that it is independent
of source variance V , which is given by the value of SNR.
Now let us suppose we plug in the attenuation at the trusted
side, which is aimed at the purification of the signal states.
Then SNR puts the constraint on attenuation T as all other pa-
rameters are given and we can express T as T (Σ, V,∆V, η).
Similarly, we reculaculate the lower bound on the secure key
as Ieff (Σ, V,∆V, η, β) and estimate the threshold on prepara-
tion noise ∆V , when the attenuation T , unlike in the previous
sections, is no more optimized, but is explicitly given by the
SNR and other parameters. In Fig. 9 we present the results
as the 3D plot of the security region, describing the maximal
tolerable preparation noise ∆Vmax versus reconciliation ef-
ficiency β and SNR, realistic source variance V = 20 and
typical channel loss η = 0.1.
Any practical scheme has its own dependence of reconcil-
iation efficiency on SNR, which is related to the intristic pa-
rameters of the scheme, which can be graphically described
by a curve in the β, SNR plain. Thus, in order to estimate
the tolerance of the particular scheme to the preparation noise
and the effectiveness of state purification, one should project
this curve on surfaces at Figs. 8 and 9 respectively. Never-
theless, in the general case, it is evident from both plots, that
the preparation noise is significantly limiting the securirty of
the scheme in the large region of SNR and reconciliation ef-
ficiency β. At the same time, the applicable purification on
the trusted side can essentially improve the tolerance to the
preparation noise, not reducing the applicability area in terms
of SNR and β. Interestingly, this area is even increased by
purification, giving a high threshold on tolerable preparation
noise for low SNR and β, although the key rate in this area is
very low and can be thus drastically affected by other practical
10
FIG. 9: Threshold on the preparation noise versus reconciliation ef-
ficiency β and SNR for realistic source variance V = 20 and typical
channel loss η = 0.1 when the states are purified by attenuation T ;
values of∆Vmax are bounded by 10 for the convenience of graphical
representation.
imperfections.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the influence of the noisy modula-
tion on the security of the quantum key distribution scheme
based on the coherent states upon realistic conditions of chan-
nel loss and detection (trusted) or channel (untrusted) excess
noise. While the preparation noise was shown to be destruc-
tive to secure transmission, which reveals an essential differ-
ence between two types of trusted noise, we investigate the
possibility of suppressing the preparation noise. It is shown
that optimal purification on the trusted sender side drastically
increases the security region in terms of the tolerable prepara-
tion noise if the channel itself is not security breaking. Thus,
noisy coherent states are as useful for the secure key distribu-
tion as the pure coherent states. In the case of the high source
variance, the optimal purification is shown to practically com-
pensate the negative effect of preparation noise, which other-
wise would be destructive for the transmission. The positive
effect of purification is preserved also in the conditions of re-
alistic key reconciliation with nonunity efficiency. While pu-
rification by attenuation is already being used to reduce the
modulation noise and optimize the modulation for the given
reconciliation efficiency, the more advanced methods out of
the scope of linear operations, in particular, feedback control
of the modulated signals, can be even more effective and may
be the subject for further research.
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